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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

May 2

pictures of the Migs and the T-34 tanks to do the job. There is a new atmosphere of urgency in Washington this week. You can see it, for example, in the extensive efforts President Kennedy has made to enlist solid bipartisan support for his actions toward both Cuba and Laos, efforts, as I see it, which are being directed, by the way, toward support for future actions, not for those already past.

What the next move will be only time, of course, will tell. Personally, I think we ought to set up an immediate naval blockade of Cuba. We simply can't tolerate further Russian weapons, including the possibility of long-range nuclear missiles, being located in Cuba. Obviously, we can't stop them from coming in, however, just by talk. A naval blockade would be thoroughly in line with the Monroe Doctrine, would be a relatively simple operation to carry out, and would bring an abrupt end to Soviet penetration of our hemisphere.

[From U.S. News & World Report, May 8, 1961]

NEXT FOR CUBA: AN ARMS BLOCKADE?

Look at Castro now—cockier than ever, with arms and agents to threaten the Americas.

How can the United States act?

Blockade is one answer offered by experts. In it they see a way to isolate Cuba, stop infiltration, maybe finish Castro, too.

This is the question now facing President Kennedy: How to put a stop to the Soviet buildup in Cuba and to Communist infiltration of this hemisphere?

On April 25, the White House reported that a total embargo of remaining U.S. trade with Cuba was being considered. Its aim: To undermine further Cuba's economy, weaken Castro.

Another strategy—bolder and tougher—was also attracting notice in Washington: A naval and air blockade to cut Cuba off from the world, destroy Castro.

Blockade, in the view of military and civilian experts, could restore teeth to the Monroe Doctrine. It could halt a flood of Communist arms and strategic supplies now reaching Castro. It could stop Cuban re-export of guns and propaganda materials to South America. It would be the most severe reprisal, short of declared war, that the United States could invoke against Castro.

It is the strategy of blockade, therefore, that is suddenly at the center of attention of administration officials, Members of Congress, officers in the Pentagon. As a possible course of action, it also is the center of debate and is raising many questions. Among these questions:

WHAT WOULD A CUBA BLOCKADE TAKE?

Military experts say a tight naval blockade off Cuban ports and at the approaches to Cuban waters would require two naval task forces, each built around an aircraft carrier with a complement of about 100 planes and several destroyers.

The Navy, on April 25, announced it is bringing back the carrier *Shangri-La* from the Mediterranean, increasing to four the number of attack carriers in the vicinity of Cuba. More than 36 other big Navy ships are no less than a day's sailing time away.

To round out the blockading force, submarines would be needed—to locate, identify and track approaching vessels. Land-based radar would help with this task. So would radar picket ships. A squadron of Navy jets and another of long-range patrol planes would add support to the carrier task forces.

Three requirements go with a blockade: It must be proclaimed; the blockading force must be powerful enough to enforce it; and it must be enforced without discrimination.

Once these conditions of international law are met, countries that try to run to block-

ade do so at their own risk. Blockade runners can be stopped—by gunfire, if necessary—searched and held, at least temporarily. They could be sent to U.S. ports for rulings whether cargo should be confiscated.

WHAT COULD A BLOCKADE ACCOMPLISH?

Plenty, say the experts. In a broad sense, it would reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine by opposing Communist interference in the Western Hemisphere. It could, by avoiding direct intervention, provide a short-of-war strategy to meet short-of-war infiltration.

Primary target would be shipments of tanks, guns, aviation gasoline and ammunition coming from Russia and Czechoslovakia. Shipments of arms from Western countries could similarly be seized as contraband. In a total blockade, action could also be taken against ships bringing in chemicals, oils, textiles, and even foodstuffs. At times, three ships a day from the Soviet bloc are unloading in Cuban ports. Castro's military machine and his economy could be squeezed as hard as the United States felt necessary to bring about his downfall.

To be totally effective, surface blockade must be accompanied by air blockade. Here, argument is heard. Some experts insist that all air traffic for Cuba would have to be diverted, forced to turn back or to land at designated friendly airfields. Those that pass U.S. ground checks could continue.

Other experts see this as risky business, creating danger of aerial duels and—if the Soviets wanted to press hard enough—the danger of war. These experts claim the risk is not worth it. They are convinced the Soviet bloc could not give substantial airlift support to Cuba, because of the long distances involved. They point out that, during the Berlin blockade, it cost the United States more than \$200 million to airlift 1.2 million tons of supplies for short distances. A glance at a world map shows the limitations of a Soviet effort in the Caribbean.

WOULD THE UNITED STATES BE GOING IT ALONE?

Almost certainly, say the experts. They see no chance of either the United Nations or the Organization of American States lending approval to a peacetime blockade of a member state. Those who favor a blockade of Cuba are not deterred by this.

President Kennedy, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, has the power to order the Navy into any action short of declared war, even though shots may be fired. Use of a carrier task force by President Eisenhower last November off Guatemala and Nicaragua was, in essence, a Pacific blockade with orders to prevent the landing of armed forces and supplies from Cuba. Panama received similar U.S. naval help in 1959. In 1954, the Navy was alerted to search for a ship carrying arms to Guatemala.

BUT A PEACETIME BLOCKADE—IS THAT LEGAL?

A debate is now developing over just how far the United States can go in a blockade of Cuba, and stay within bounds of international law.

Basically, there are two kinds of blockade. One is the belligerent blockade that accompanies declared and open warfare. The United States has taken part in three major belligerent blockades—in the Civil War and in World Wars I and II. Belligerent blockades have been common in history and are governed by well-established "regulations."

Second type is the Pacific blockade, usually defined as a reprisal in time of peace, to block off trade. Pacific blockades are not recognized in a strict sense, but are accepted as acts against international delinquency. The British and French, for example, joined in establishing a Pacific blockade against the Dutch in 1831.

A Pacific blockade can be invoked without declaration of war, but some U.S. experts believe that any naval blockade without sanction of an international organization is an act of war. They say that it would depend

entirely on how Cuba and Castro regard and interpret the action.

Main point that troubles the legalists is this: There is considerable doubt whether a Pacific blockade would give a clear right to stop any but Cuban and U.S. ships. The United States, for example, has argued in the past that a Pacific blockade cannot legally be applied against a third power. Under this interpretation, Soviet vessels must be allowed free access to Cuba if the United States is to pay strict regard to international law. This is important to those who want to make a blockade conform as closely as possible to precedent.

Others say this is a time to be practical and not legal. They see the situation boiling down to this: If the United States is determined to act first and argue later about the legal aspects, a blockade can be made effective.

The Ignored Remedy

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 2, 1961

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, on May 1, 1961, I inserted in the RECORD an article entitled "Forgotten Remedy for the Voteless Negro," from the January 21, 1961, issue of the Nation. In the February 18 issue of the same publication the following comment appeared in the letters to the editor column. Assuming an interest on the part of our colleagues in the possible consequences of the enforcement of the discussed statute of 1872, I commend the item to the attention of our colleagues. It follows:

THE IGNORED STATUTE

DEAR SIR: In the splendid article "Forgotten Remedy for the Voteless Negro" in your January 21 issue, the authors, Thomas I. Emerson and Arthur E. Bonfield, overlooked a very important matter. I made a study of the subject some 15 years ago; as a result, I suggested to Earl Warren, then Governor of California, that the State of California sue the State of South Carolina in the U.S. Supreme Court to have the number of Representatives of South Carolina reduced from six to one in conformity with the provisions of section 2 of the 14th amendment and the enforcing statute of 1872. At that time, it took 13 times as many electors to elect one Congressman in the State of Connecticut as it did in South Carolina, the two States having almost equal populations.

Messrs. Emerson and Bonfield, after quoting certain provisions of section 2 of the 14th amendment, say: "In addition to section 2 an almost unknown statute, originally framed in 1872 and still on the books, contains the same requirement." Later on they say: "Certainly advocates of civil rights should mount a full-scale effort to force Congress to honor the Constitutional mandate."

A close reading of section 2 of the 14th amendment and the statute of 1872 reveals that the former reduces the "basis of representation" and that the latter reduces the "representation" of any offending State, according to the same formula.

Congress has now power to change the basis of representation. It does have the power, and, indeed, the duty, to change the representation of an offending State in conformity with the mandate of section 2 of the 14th amendment. This Congress did by the

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of the doctrine which I continually espouse that we are each our brothers keeper. We have a right to respect our traditions while respecting the traditions of others.

We have probably drawn closer together in the last two decades than at any other time in the history of the Jewish people, motivated by common fears, deeply touched by the suffering and heroism of Jewish people in other lands, and proud of the birth of a new republic.

There is nothing wrong in our sympathetic kinship with Israel—remembering however that as Americans our loyalties are first, last, and always with the United States of America.

For here in our country the Jewish people have advanced more rapidly on the social and economic scale than any other minority group in any place in the world.

This has been true not only because of our own capabilities, not only because of the American atmosphere of fair play and equality—despite the rabble rousers—but because we have clung tenaciously to group survival despite the great assimilative forces of American life, and as a group have fought for our rights as individuals.

In safeguarding our traditions and rights through organizations like B'nai B'rith we ought never to forget that other ethnic groups have not fared as well as we and that the Jewish traditions of sympathy and fairplay must extend to Negroes and Puerto Ricans and Catholics and all others.

What is remarkable in our country is that in the midst of so many tensions there should be so striking a measure of success in living together.

But the gains we have achieved—the gains that are yet to come—must be safeguarded through organizations like B'nai B'rith, for in safeguarding our rights as individuals we surely help the great American dream of equality of opportunity for everyone and the world dream of eternal peace.

I ask all of you therefore to join me in revitalizing our lodge—I ask you to join with me in participating in the many activities we plan.

I ask you to be a conscious and active member.

I shall do my part to the best of my ability.

Tribute to Retiring Publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger and Editorial Page Editor Charles Merz, of the New York Times

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN V. LINDSAY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 13, 1961

Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to a great newspaper, the New York Times, on the occasion of a major change in its top executive command.

Arthur Hays Sulzberger has been a distinguished publisher of this distinguished newspaper and it is fitting that we take due notice of his major contribution to American journalism on the occasion of his retirement. I am pleased to note that Mr. Sulzberger will continue to serve as chairman of the board of the New York Times.

Mr. Sulzberger's successor as publisher is Mr. Orvil E. Dryfoos, who is president of the New York Times Co., and who has been with the Times since 1942. Mr.

Dryfoos' outstanding career as a journalist guarantees that the high standards which have made the Times one of the world's great newspapers will be maintained.

I am also pleased to note that Mr. John B. Oakes, a member of the Times staff since 1946, has been appointed as editorial page editor. Mr. Oakes succeeds Charles Merz, editor since 1938, who now becomes editor emeritus.

I should like at this time, Mr. Speaker, to pay warm tribute to Arthur Hays Sulzberger and Charles Merz on the occasion of their retirement from distinguished careers in American journalism.

My heartiest congratulations go to their successors, Orvil E. Dryfoos and John B. Oakes, who can be counted upon to sustain the illustrious tradition of the New York Times.

The people of the 17th District of New York, and I as their Representative in Congress, take great pride in the New York Times as one of the great and authoritative newspapers of the world.

Politics a Key Factor in Defense Transfers

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH

OF KANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 2, 1961

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the following editorial from the Kansas City Star of April 29. It hits a well-known nail on the head. I think my colleagues will be interested in it:

POLITICS A KEY FACTOR IN DEFENSE TRANSFERS

Now there is a striking illustration in Washington of the varying reactions to proposed shift in defense installations from one State to another.

Not a peep came from the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee when the Kennedy administration recently decided to move an important naval air unit from Olathe, Kans., to Glynnco, Ga. Presumably, the committee chairman Representative CARL VINSON, was pleased by the plan. He hails from Georgia, the beneficiary of the proposed move. Moreover, VINSON is very much the leader of his State's delegation in the House, where he is the senior Member after Speaker SAM RAYBURN.

Because of his great power, VINSON was recently asked to intervene in a fight being made by another Democratic Congressman, Representative SIDNEY R. YATES, to keep the Army's food processing plant in Chicago. VINSON expressed his concern and asked the Secretary of the Army for a complete review of a decision to move the food plant to Natick, Mass.

There may be sound military reasons for moving the plant to Massachusetts, just as there might be for the transfer that would benefit Georgia. But a hint of politics can be detected in both cases. Massachusetts happens to be the home State of the House majority leader, Representative JOHN W. MCCORMACK, as well as of the President of the United States.

We have noticed that States in which a President is particularly interested seem to

have unusual luck in getting defense contracts and military activities. Certainly western Missouri fared better when Harry S. Truman was in the White House. And Denver became a major production center for missiles after Mr. Eisenhower started spending his presidential vacations in the Colorado City.

These could be mere coincidences. But it is human nature for Government officials to try to please a President. We don't expect VINSON to challenge the decision that would take payrolls and contracts to Georgia at the expense of Olathe and Greater Kansas City. His intervention for Chicago is a political horse of another color.

Cuba file

Naval Blockade of Cuba

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. SAMUEL S. STRATTON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 2, 1961

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, in my latest newsletter to my constituents I urged the imposition of a naval blockade of Cuba as the only effective method of preventing continued Soviet armaments from coming into the Western Hemisphere in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Yesterday, I had the privilege of reading a thoughtful article in the U.S. News & World Report of May 8 which discussed this type of action in more detail, including both its advantages and its disadvantages.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I include the relevant portion of my newsletter, together with the text of the article from the U.S. News & World Report:

YOUR CONGRESSMAN, SAMUEL S. STRATTON, REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON, MAY 1, 1961

Cuban S.S.R.: Whatever may have been the setbacks resulting from the unsuccessful attempt of the Cuban rebels to establish a beachhead on the Castro-held mainland last week, there was at least one positive benefit, and that was the clear-cut revelation to the whole world of the complete conversion of Cuba into a Russian-dominated military base.

In fact, one of the major reasons for the failure of the ill-starred expedition appears to have been a lack of full information on the extent to which Cuba has been getting this Russian military equipment. Somehow, the pictures and stories of Soviet T-34 tanks on Cuban beaches and Russian Mig jet fighters strafing rebel troops has brought home to all of us the stark, blunt truth of what it means to have a Russian military base 90 miles away from home. Russian tanks and planes in Cuba jeopardize the security of the United States, violate the Monroe Doctrine, and threaten the security of every other Latin American republic.

Once the full extent of this Russian military penetration of Cuba was clear, President Kennedy announced we would take whatever action was appropriate to prevent this, even if we had to go it alone. But the Latin American republics who have been rather inclined to drag their feet on taking action against Castro also reacted swiftly last week by finally throwing Cuba off the Inter-American Defense Board. For years the United States had been trying to get these countries to exclude Castro's representative from secret military talks. But it took the